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Abstract 
Background: Central banks set economy-wide interest rates to meet exclusively economic 
objectives. There is a strong link between indebtedness and psychiatric morbidity at the individual 
level, with interest rates being an important factor determining ability to repay debt. However, no 
prior research has explored whether central bank interest rate changes directly inﬂuence mental 
health, nor whether this varies by levels of indebtedness. 
Methods: We use British data (N = 93,255) to explore whether the Bank of England base-rate 
aﬀected how perceived burden of non-mortgage debt (low, medium, and high) inﬂuenced 
psychiatric morbidity. Psychiatric morbidity was measured using the General Health Questionnaire 
(GHQ-12). Our primary outcome measure was a binary indicator of “psychiatric caseness ” (> 3 on 
a 0–12 scale). We also used the GHQ-12 as a continuous measure of distress. 
Results: When interest rates are high (low) there is an increased (decreased) risk of psychiatric 
morbidity only among those with a high debt burden (b = 0.026, p= 0.02). This result was robust to 
alternative explanations.Thus a 1 percentage point base-rate increase is associated with a 2.6% 
increase that someone with a high debt burden will experience psychiatric morbidity.Limitations: 
Our study uses subjective indicators of debt burden. We were unable to determine the mechanism 
behind our eﬀect. 
 
Conclusions: Changes in central bank interest rates to meet economic objectives pose a threat to 
mental health.Mental health support is needed for those in debt and central banks may need to 
consider how their decisions inﬂuence population mental health 
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Central Bank Interest Rate Decisions, Household Indebtedness, and Psychiatric Morbidity and 
Distress: Evidence from the UK  
There is a strong link between problem debt and common mental disorders at the individual 
level (Drentea, 2000; Reading & Reynolds, 2001). The extent to which debt is a problem often 
depends upon personal factors, absolute level of debt, and income available to finance the debt 
(Fitch, Hamilton, Bassett, & Davey, 2011). However, there are also major economic policy 
decisions, outside of the control of the individual, which have the potential to both alleviate and 
intensify the incidence of mental health issues associated with debt. For example, fiscal policy, 
which is the means by which a government influences the economy via adjusting tax and spend 
levels, can influence the availability of mental health care resources (Saxena, Thornicroft, Knapp, & 
Whiteford, 2007) and protect those who may be the most vulnerable to mental health issues (Lundin 
& Hemmingsson, 2009). Monetary policy, which is the counterpart to fiscal policy and conducted 
by central banks, influences the economy via controlling the economy’s money supply (Mankiw, 
2009). A key monetary policy tool for controlling the money supply is by changing the interest rate 
to which debt must be repaid. Although there is a literature highlighting important effects of 
macroeconomic factors (Faresjö et al., 2013; Katikireddi, Niedzwiedz, & Popham, 2012), there has 
been no research in assessing how central bank interest rate decisions, determined exogenously to 
the individual, might directly influence mental health.  
The remit of a central bank is exclusively economic. For example, the Bank of England’s 
stated objective is ”to maintain price stability – as defined by the Government’s 2 percent inflation 
target – and, subject to that, to support the Government’s economic policies, including those for 
growth and employment” (Bank of England, 2013). Although there may be indirect societal-wide 
benefits to psychological health of having a stable economy with low unemployment (Reeves, 
McKee, & Stuckler, 2014; Stuckler, Basu, Suhrcke, Coutts, & McKee, 2009; Zivin, Paczkowski, & 
Galea, 2011) the tools that a central bank uses to achieve these economic objectives may themselves 
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pose a direct psychological risk and this may in turn have an economic cost to society (see, Layard, 
2006). 
Central banks set the short-term interest rate – the base-rate – at which private banks can 
lend money from the Bank of England. Private banks then pass this interest rate change on to the 
wider economy via the rate individuals pay on loans or receive from savings (George et al., 1999). 
Based on previous literature there is good reason to suppose that those who are more greatly 
burdened by their debt will have non-trivial mental health reactions to changes in central bank 
interest rates. High levels of debt burden may reflect a ‘moral stressor’ (Doehring, 2016) where 
by“…one knows the right thing to do, but institutional constraints make it nearly impossible to 
pursue the right course of action" (Jameton, 1984, p. 6). This reflects uncertainty about a person’s 
ability to fulfil their moral obligations (Reynolds, Owens, & Rubenstien, 2012), resulting in feelings 
of shame and guilt (Hirdman, 2016; Jeong, 2016). All else being equal, an external change in 
interest rates will affect the debtor’s ability to manage their debt. However, a reduced sense of 
ability to repay, if already feeling guilty or shamed, may push the debtor towards social withdrawal 
and psychological distress. This may be especially the case for those with higher levels of debt 
burden, who are more likely to have lower self-efficacy (Kuhen & Melzer, 2017). Those with low 
self-efficacy report high levels of psychological distress (Selenko & Batinic, 2011) and seek less 
help for their debt (Lim, Heckman, Letkiewicz, & Montallo, 2014) when financial stress is high (for 
example when interest rate changes affect the ability to repay). Furthermore, those with higher 
levels of debt burden are more present orientated, and therefore less able to plan for future changes 
(Webley & Nyhus, 2001). Thus, we hypothesise based on this previous literature that interest rate 
changes will influence the mental health of those with high debt burden.  
Method 
Participants 
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We examine our hypotheses using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a randomly 
sampled longitudinal study of British households (see Taylor, Brice, Buck, & Prentice-Lane, 2010, 
for sampling information). The dataset includes 18 waves of data, beginning in September 1991, 
with the last wave of data collection taking place in April 2009. We use 14 waves of the BHPS from 
September 1995 to April 2009 where questions about debt and savings are available. In each wave 
of the BHPS the heads of each household are first interviewed to obtain household level 
information. Next individuals in the household are interviewed to gauge individual information, and 
then individuals are administered a self-completion questionnaire. The self-completion 
questionnaire contains questions relating to mental health. Since questions about debt are asked at 
the household level we focus on individuals that indicate that they are the head of their household 
and that were 18 or over. There were a total of 104,593 observations across 16,953 individuals 
indicating themselves as head of the household in the BHPS across this time period. Thus the same 
individuals, although not necessarily in every wave, are involved throughout the study. However, 
questions on mental health (8.7%) and questions about debt and savings (7.2%) were not answered 
in every year by every individual. Since these were our key hypothesis variables we included in our 
analysis only those observations with non-missing values for these key independent variables. This 
resulted in a sample that included 93,255 observations across 15,818 participants (34% female, age 
18 to 100, M = 50.57, SD = 17.72).  
Measures 
Interest rates: Figure 1 (left hand-section) shows that between September 1995 to April 
2009 the Bank of England base-rate ranged from 0.5% to 7.5% and there were a total of 52 interest 
rate-periods (51 base-rate change announcements). We match the Bank of England base-rate with 
the day on which each individual was interviewed. Further, owing to either short interest-rate 
periods or that there were no interviews taking place from May to August some interest rate periods 
are matched to relatively few or no individuals. However, since the interest rate on the day of an 
individual’s interview might not always represent the interest rate faced by the individual across the 
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entire year we also examine the average of the Bank of England base-rate in the year up until the 
individual’s interview (previous year’s base-rate average) as an alternative indicator of interest 
rates.  
Mental health was measured using the 12-item version of the General Health Questionnaire 
across all 14 waves. Items in the GHQ-12 (e.g., "thinking of self as worthless”) are scored as 
follows: “not at all = 0”, “no more than usual = 0”, “rather more than usual = 1”, or “much more 
than usual = 1” (range = 0 to 12). As a continuous measure this indicates general increasing 
“psychological distress” (Goldberg & Williams, 1991). although we carry out an analysis using the 
continuous measure, we also make use of the GHQ-12 as an indication of “psychiatric caseness”, 
whereby this is indicated by a score above a threshold according to that set out in Goldberg et al. 
(1997) for various populations. The binary version of the GHQ-12, however, is typically used for 
clinical screening rather than a diagnostic tool and indicates psychiatric morbidity. 
Household debt position is determined by answers to questions regarding debt and savings. 
In each wave of the BHPS individuals are asked: “Do you save any amount of your income for 
example by putting something away now and then in a bank, building society, or Post Office 
account other than to meet regular bills?” Individuals answer either yes or no. 
Individuals are also asked: “Do you or anyone in your household have to make repayments 
on hire purchases or loans?” Individuals are specifically asked not to include mortgage loans but to 
include Department of Social Security (DSS) social fund loans. Individuals answer either yes or no. 
Directly following this the individual is then asked “to what extent is the repayment of such debts 
and the interest a financial burden on your household?” Individuals answered either “a heavy 
burden”, “somewhat of a burden”, or “not a problem” for their household. From this question we 
generated three dummy variables to indicate the extent to which debt, if present, was a burden on 
the household.  
Those that reported that their debt was “not a problem” scored 1.55 (SD = 2.70, 95% CI: 
1.51 – 1.59) on average using the GHQ-12 and had a psychiatric caseness rate of 0.16 (SD = 0.37, 
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95% CI: 0.16 – 0.17). Those that reported that their debt was “somewhat of a problem” scored 2.41 
(SD = 3.34, 95% CI: 2.33 – 2.48) on average using the GHQ-12 and had a psychiatric caseness rate 
of 0.26 (SD = 0.44, 95% CI: 0.25 – 0.27). Those that reported that their debt was “a heavy burden” 
scored 4.13 (SD = 4.09, 95% CI: 3.98 – 4.23) on average using the GHQ-12 and had a psychiatric 
caseness rate of 0.46 (SD = 0.50, 95% CI: 0.44 – 0.48). ANOVA showed a significant difference 
between each of the groups in the GHQ-12 (f = 662.28, p = 0.000, r2 = 0.02) and the incidence of 
psychiatric caseness (f = 491.26, p = 0.000, r2 = 0.02).  
We also calculated the proportion of individuals reaching the threshold for psychiatric 
caseness among persons that were heavily indebted across each of the 52 interest rate periods. In 
many cases there were insufficient observations to ensure reliable estimates of psychiatric caseness 
among this group due to relatively few or no individuals being interviewed in that interest rate 
period (23 interest rate periods have 10 or less observations). In Figure 1 we plotted for each 
interest rate period, where there were sufficient observations within each interest rate period (n > 
40), the incidence of psychiatric caseness against the Bank of England base-rate (r = .48, p < .05). 
The subjective nature of the question on debt burden may draw some concern. However, it 
has been suggested, for example, that objective indicators do not give a complete picture of the 
pressures of debt as there are often factors that we cannot observe that may make debt a problem 
(Keese, 2012). Further, there is also some concern that the question itself, due to an explicit 
reference to interest, may prime individuals into thinking about the prevailing interest rate rather 
than the burden of repaying their debt. Thus, it is possible that our key variable acts only as an 
indication of an individual disliking interest rather than the size of their debt. We, therefore, attempt 
an objective verification of our indicator of problem debt using self-reported level of debt and the 
ratio of this debt to household income. In waves 5, 10, and 15 of the BHPS individuals are asked 
whether they have any financial commitments apart from mortgages. Individuals are then asked 
how much to the nearest pound sterling they owe on these commitments. Those who “don’t know” 
are further asked in turn whether the amount is more than £100, £500, £1,500, £5,000, £10,000. 
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After recoding each of the categorical answers to the means of those who gave precise values of 
their debt (e.g., the mean debt of those with between £100 and £500 was inputted for those who had 
more that £100 of debt but less than £500) we then divided this amount of debt by household 
income to give a debt to income ratio. Those who reported a heavy burden of debt had an average 
debt of £6,122 (SD = 9,415, 95% CI: 5,354 – 6,890), representing a debt to household income ratio 
of 0.36 (SD = 0.95, 95% CI: 0.28 – 0.44), whereas those who reported debt was somewhat of a 
burden had a mean debt of £4,578 (SD = 7,304, 95% CI: 4,226 – 4,930) and a debt to household 
income ratio of 0.24 (SD = 1.16, 95% CI: 0.19 – 0.30). Those who reported that debt was not a 
problem had a debt level of £3,757 (SD = 10,563, 95% CI: 3,389 – 4,126) with a ratio of 0.21 (SD = 
2.54, 95% CI: 0.12 – 0.30). ANOVA showed that there was a significant difference between the 
absolute levels of debt (f = 468.8, p = 0.000, r2 = 0.07) and follow up t-tests showed that absolute 
levels of debt in all categories were significantly different from each other (lowest t = 2.78, highest 
p = 0.006). Since those that indicated they had a higher debt burden also had higher objective debt 
we take this as evidence of a reliable indicator of problem debt and that it is unlikely to only 
indicate a dislike of interest rates.  
Covariates: There are a number of factors that are likely to correlate with an individual’s 
household debt position and mental health. Thus we include in all our regressions a set of 
observable controls including education level, marital status, household size and whether there were 
children in the house, disability status, employment status, and log of household income. There was 
missing data for some of these covariates. Where there was missing data for categorical variables 
we included an extra category to indicate those individuals who had missing data. Where there were 
missing values for continuous variables; the log of household income (0.4%), we imputed values 
using multiple imputation (Rubin, 2004). Table 1 gives descriptive statistics across the variables in 
our mental health sample. 
We also included in all regressions time-period dummies to account for national factors, 
such as macroeconomic conditions, that may have simultaneously influenced both debt and mental 
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health. Although there is no strong reason to think that our effect will be explained by 
macroeconomic factors other than interest rates it is important to eliminate these potential 
explanations. Thus in a later robustness test we include macroeconomic variables directly as well as 
their interaction with our household debt position variables. Specifically, we include unemployment 
rate in the month of the interview, regional house price growth in the quarter of the interview, and 
inflation and GDP per capita growth rate in the year of the interview.  
Empirical Specification 
We investigate how interest rates at the time of an individual’s interview relate to mental 
health, as indicated by scores om the GHQ-12 (caseness/morbidity or continuous), using the 
following model: 
(1) 𝑀𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑟𝑖𝑡
 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑟𝑖𝑡 + μ𝑖 + δ𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑘=1 + ε𝑖𝑡 
Where Debt Burden is the extent the individual thinks their debt is a burden to their 
household and captured using dummy variables. Not a problem, somewhat of a problem, a heavy 
burden relative to those with no debt. 
Mental health for individual i at time t, depends on the interest rate faced by an individual at 
the time of the interview, r. We expect the effect of the interest rate on individual mental health to 
be dependent on a household’s debt position. Thus we include indicators of whether an individual 
saves, and the extent to which any unsecured debt, if they have any, is a burden on their household 
as main effect variables. We also interact these variables with interest rates so as to determine 
whether there are differences in how interest rates influence individuals in each of these groups. 
Whilst we expect there may be some benefit when interest rates are high for savers (a positive 
coefficient on the interaction term for savers – β3Saver*r) and some detriment to those with some 
debt we expect a high interest rate to be particularly detrimental for those with a heavy debt burden 
(i.e., a large negative coefficient on the interest rate-heavy burden interaction term).  
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There are a number of factors that may explain both debt and mental health. This includes 
time-period factors that would be expected to influence all individuals equally at any given time-
period, δ, an array of k observable characteristics x, and individual specific factors, µ. We account 
for the time period factors, δ, by including dummy variables to indicate the wave in which an 
individual’s interview took place. We control for observable characteristics, x, by including 
demographic and socio-economic variables. Individual specific factors, µ, consist of potential 
confounding aspects that are characteristic of the individual but are unobservable, immeasurable, or 
simply unknown. Such baseline individual differences might include, for example, people’s 
perception of how bad debt is, personality characteristics, self-efficacy, and/or ability to forward 
plan. Baseline levels of unobserved or unknown variables are fully controlled for through 
estimation based on explaining the within-person variation relationship of the variables. Our within-
person estimation strategy fully exploits the longitudinal nature of the data and minimises the 
possibility that unchanging individual specific factors that are unobservable, immeasurable, or 
simply unknown drive our results. Additionally, variables that are known but do not vary across 
time, such as sex, are implicitly controlled for in the analysis. Although the focus on within-person 
changes across time results in imprecise estimates on variables that do not have high within person 
variation (Boyce, 2010) our approach does, since interest rates are determined exogenously to the 
individual, enable a possible causal interpretation (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). In our models any 
components that remain unexplainable are assumed to be captured by an idiosyncratic error term ε. 
 In all cases we assume linearity in our dependent variables. This includes the psychiatric 
caseness/morbidity binary outcome variable where we carry out an estimation using a linear 
probability model. Since individuals and interest rates are measured at different levels i.e. we 
observe the same individuals across a number of time-points and interest rates are the same within a 
given time-period for many individuals, the error terms are likely to be clustered. We account for 
clustering for both levels of measurement by estimating 2 way standard errors (Cameron & Miller, 
2015). All analyses were carried out using Stata 12. 
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Results 
We first examine the extent to which the Bank of England base-rate on the day of an individual’s 
survey interview predicts mental health. We then examine whether using the average interest rate 
over the year up until the individual’s survey interview provide a better explanation. Table 2 shows 
the results. Columns 1 and 2 show the results for psychiatric caseness/morbidity and columns 3 and 
4 show the results when GHQ-12 is treated as a continuous measure. Across all analyses interest 
rates are on average not linked to mental health. However, a consideration of the interaction terms 
suggests that the influence of interest rates on mental health depends on household debt position. 
We observe that with increasing debt burden there is a tendency toward reduced mental health when 
interest rates are high. In particular, for those that experience debt as a heavy burden there is a 
negative effect on mental health when interest rates are high. We note, however, that none of the 
main effects on our savings or debt burden variables are significant. Given that we observed strong 
cross-sectional differences between mental health and our debt burden variables as highlighted in 
our Methods section this may draw some concern. However, this is likely to arise in part because 
our estimation strategy, which focuses exclusively on within-person variation and, therefore, allows 
a possible causal interpretation, is known to produce imprecise estimates on variables that do not 
vary much within individuals (Boyce, 2010). Since our savings and debt burden variables vary little 
over time for each individual relative to the variation across individuals this explains this effect.  
Results from the linear probability regression using the average interest rate over the 
previous year in column 2 suggest that a one percentage point increase in the base-rate is linked to a 
2.6% increase in the likelihood that someone with a heavy debt burden will experience psychiatric 
morbidity. If we were to consider an interest rate movement of 4 percentage points (93% of the 
observations in our sample experienced interest rates between 3.5% and 7.5%) this would increase 
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the relative risk of someone with a heavy debt burden by 10.4%1. Although these effects might be 
considered small (between 0.05 and 0.10 of a standard deviation) given that our analyses are based 
on within-person changes and interest rate changes are exogenous to the individual our results have 
a possible causal interpretation (Angrist & Pischke, 2008).. 
Alternative macroeconomic explanations 
An alternative explanation of our result is that this effect is driven by other macroeconomic 
variables correlated with the Bank of England base-rate. Over the time period of our study as 
average interest rates in the previous year correlates with monthly unemployment rate (r = .58), 
yearly inflation rate (r = .06), yearly GDP per capita growth rate (r = -.21), and quarterly house 
price growth (r = .18). To account for these alternative explanations, we include the unemployment 
rate in the month of the interview, regional house price growth in the quarter of the interview, and 
inflation and GDP per capita growth rate in the year of the interview as additional explanatory 
variables, as well as their interactions with the household debt position variables – savers and debt 
burden. The results using average interest rates are found in Table 3 and show our results are robust 
to these alternative explanations. Further, since there were substantial macroeconomic changes, 
which included dramatic Bank of England base-rate decreases, in the final wave of our data we also 
re-ran our analyses excluding the final wave. The results were consistent with our main analyses. 
Discussion 
Our research is the first to illustrate that monetary policy decisions, via changes in interest 
rates, can have direct implications for mental health. Our analyses revealed, as hypothesised, that 
                                                 
1 We explored different thresholds for psychiatric caseness. In our sample when we selected 
a cut-off of >2 the incidence rate was 26%, whereas a cut-off of >4 gave an incidence rate of 16%. 
When we analysed our data using these alternate thresholds the coefficients on the heavy debt were 
statistically significant for both a cut-off>2 (b = 0.033) and a cut-off>4 (b = 0.020).  
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when economy-wide interest rates are high (low) there is an increased (decreased) risk of lower 
mental health among the heavily indebted. Since interest rates are determined primarily by factors 
exogenous to the individual and we examined within-person changes our results have a possible 
causal interpretation, with a one percentage point increase in the Bank of England base-rate 
increasing the risk of psychiatric caseness/morbidity by at least 2.6% among those heavily indebted. 
Governments, policymakers, and mental health practitioners need to be aware of the 
implications that monetary policy decisions may have on mental health. Access to credit is an 
important aspect of modern society and may help individuals invest in their future, but debt, which 
is at present at historically high levels, may become unsustainable. Low interest rates may be useful 
for increasing investment and therefore boosting a country’s economy but low rates also encourage 
the uptake of more personal debt (Gross & Souleles, 2002). When interest rates are low high debt 
may be serviceable but as these rates rise high levels of debt may become unmanageable and put 
many people’s mental health at risk. Although those heavily indebted represented only 2.9% of 
observations in our sample this suggests that in a country, such as the UK, where there are 26.4 
million households, we would expect there to be approximately 800,000 households with a heavy 
debt burden. Our finding of a marginal effect of 2.6% increase in psychiatric caseness/morbidity 
with each percentage point increase in interest rates (if only the household heads were affected) 
suggests there would be approximately 20,000 additional cases of psychiatric caseness/morbidity. 
The cost to society of one individual with psychiatric morbidity has been estimated to be at least 
£7,880 (Layard, 2006) and therefore an overall societal cost of each percentage point increase 
would be £156 million. Although it is important central banks maintain economic objectives, which 
may indirectly benefit mental health, there is a case for central banks to consider direct welfare 
implications of their decisions. There is also a strong public health case to intervene before mental 
health reaches crisis levels as a result of high indebtedness.  
Economy-wide interest rate changes, however, are not the only monetary tool that central 
banks can use to influence the economy (Joyce, Tong, & Woods, 2011). Quantitative easing (Joyce, 
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Tong, & Woods, 2011) is another strategy that attempts to increase demand in an economy through 
directly increasing the money supply. Some have suggested that a better way to improve the 
economy would be to give individuals money in the form of a debt jubilee (Keen, 2011). To the 
extent that such a debt jubilee would decrease individual debt burden, and therefore the risk of 
psychiatric morbidity, our study supports such an approach. 
Our study is not without limitations. We cannot be completely certain as to the extent to 
which the Bank of England base-rate translates to market rates. Although the transmission 
mechanism is almost immediate (George et al., 1999) we are unable to know the exact rates paid by 
individuals on their debt. For example, those with problem debt may only have access to loans with 
particularly high rates. However, whilst rates may differ across specific types of debt we believe 
that Bank of England base-rate will act as a good proxy for changes across different markets. A 
further issue is that we do not know the exact mechanism by which interest rate changes influenced 
an individual’s mental health. For example, it is not clear whether people are explicitly aware of the 
interest rate changes. Thus any effect could have been via direct impacts on an individual’s debt 
repayments or rather through anticipatory effects about future debt repayments due to individuals 
following Bank of England base-rate decisions and concerns for the future economy. This may be 
individual specific and driven by personality characteristics (see, e.g., Boyce, Wood, & Ferguson, 
2016). However, since our results were stronger using the Bank of England base-rate experienced 
over the previous year we suspect it is more likely the former. Perhaps a useful avenue for future 
research in exploring these mechanisms would be to explore objective finance related behaviour. It 
is also likely that people may vary considerably in their levels of debt between measurement points. 
We were unable to account for potential debt variation but this would be an interesting area to 
explore. Our study also only focused on non-mortgage debt. Mortgage debt is an important part of 
household debt, which can often be the most burdensome. There are several reasons why we did not 
include mortgage debt. First, the dataset did not contain an appropriate variable that would have 
enabled us to investigate the importance of mortgage debt (for example, the size of the mortgage 
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debt was unknown and there was no indication as to the burden it placed on the household). Second, 
a large proportion of the mortgage debt in the UK is based on fixed interest rates and therefore 
would not be expected to be influenced. Further, we did not have information as to whether a 
household’s mortgage was fixed or variable. Third, mortgage debt is secured against the property 
and we wanted to focus on unsecured debt, which has different consequences if not repaid. The 
extent to which a household found their unsecured debt a burden would have depended on other 
expenditures, which may have included mortgage debt. We believe it likely that were a household 
finding their mortgage debt a heavy burden then they would have also indicted that their unsecured 
debt would be a heavy burden. Nevertheless, this is a limitation of our study and an issue to address 
in future research. 
Although we objectively validated our subjective indicators of debt we cannot rule out the 
possibility that those with mental health issues may experience debt as burdensome at levels that are 
relatively low. Nevertheless, our study is the first of its kind in demonstrating a direct pathway by 
which central bank monetary policy decisions influence the prevalence of psychiatric 
caseness/morbidity. Now that this initial demonstration has been made we recommend that future 
research try to examine mechanistic pathways and overcome some of these limitations by exploring, 
for example, objective indicators of debt burden and by examining debt specific interest rates.  
While others have begun to show that central banks decisions might influence psychological 
health indirectly (Blanchflower et al., 2014) we are the first to show a direct pathway to mental 
health. Our work therefore fits with the literature highlighting the stressful effects of adverse 
macroeconomic conditions (Faresjö et al., 2013; Katikireddi et al., 2012). More generally there is a 
growing interest in using non-economic indicators to guide policy (Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2009) 
and it has been suggested that central banks should also explicitly target psychological factors (Di 
Tella & MacCulloch, 2009). Our research offers further support for this perspective.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of household heads from the British Household Panel Survey that answered both 
GHQ-12 questionnaire and answered the household debt position variables (N = 93,255) 
Variable  
 Mean (standard deviation) 
GHQ-12 Psychiatric Caseness (0; 1): 0.20 (0.40) 
GHQ-12 “bi-modal” Psychological 
distress: 
1.90 (3.01) 
Household debt position: 
Savers 
Debt not a problem 
Debt somewhat of a burden 
Heavy debt burden 
 
0.40 
0.17 
0.09 
0.03 
Age 50.57 (17.72) 
Female = 1 0.34 
Marital Status: 
Married = 1 
Never married = 1 
Widowed =1  
Divorced = 1 
Separated = 1 
 
0.49 
0.22 
0.13 
0.13 
0.03 
Household size 2.44 (1.32) 
Has children = 1 0.30 
Highest educational qualification 
GCSE = 1 
A-level = 1 
Degree = 1 
 
0.26 
0.25 
0.14 
Unemployed = 1 0.03 
Retired = 1 0.25 
Disabled = 1 0.11 
Household income £25,420 (22,050) 
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Table 2:  
The Influence of the Bank of England Base-Rate on Mental Health Moderated by Household Debt Position 
in the British Household Panel Survey (N = 93,255) 
Notes: All regressions include controls for demographic and socio-economic circumstances (education level, marital 
status, occupational status, household size and whether there were children in the house, disability status, and log of 
household income), individual specific factors (by assessing within-person variation), and time-period effects (including 
time-period dummies). In Regressions 1 and 3 we estimate robust standard errors that account for non-nested clustering 
at both the individual level and the interest rate period in which individuals were interviewed; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
  
Dependent variables: Independent variable: 
 Psychiatric  
Caseness/morbidity  (0; 1) 
GHQ-12  
“continuous” (0-12) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Interest rate -0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.011 
(0.011) 
-0.031 
(0.031) 
-0.051 
(0.079) 
Saver -0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.005 
(0.014) 
-0.108 
(0.090) 
-0.107 
(0.103) 
Interest rate*Saver -0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.008 
(0.018) 
-0.008 
(0.019) 
Debt not a problem 0.012 
(0.018) 
0.024 
(0.019) 
0.097 
(0.126) 
-0.116 
(0.131) 
Interest rate*Debt not a problem -0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.006† 
(0.004) 
-0.037 
(0.025) 
-0.040 
(0.024) 
Somewhat of a debt burden 0.021 
(0.022) 
-0.001 
(0.027) 
0.336* 
(0.168) 
0.184 
(0.196) 
Interest rate*Somewhat of a debt burden -0.001 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.029 
(0.030) 
0.000 
(0.037) 
Heavy debt burden -0.002 
(0.045) 
-0.035 
(0.053) 
0.001 
(0.283) 
-0.321 
(0.400) 
Interest rate*Heavy debt burden 0.020** 
(0.008) 
0.026** 
(0.010) 
0.169** 
(0.049) 
0.228** 
(0.074) 
     
Constant 0.132 
(0.208) 
0.165 
(0.212) 
1.259 
(1.811) 
1.262 
(1.777) 
     
Interest rate variable Day of 
interview 
Year Average  Day of 
interview 
Year 
Average  
Controls for macroeconomic interaction effects 
No No No Yes 
Observations 93255 93255 93255 93255 
Number of individuals 15818 15818 15818 15818 
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Table 3: 
The Influence of the Bank of England Base-Rate on Mental Health Moderated by Household Debt Position 
Accounting for Alternative Macro-Economic Explanations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: All regressions include controls for demographic and socio-economic circumstances (education level, marital 
status, occupational status, household size and whether there were children in the house, disability status, and log of 
household income), individual specific factors (by assessing within-person variation), and time-period effects (including 
time-period dummies), macroeconomic interactions (monthly unemployment rate, regional quarterly house price 
growth, inflation, and GDP per capita growth rate as main effect variables and interactions with household debt 
position). We estimate robust standard errors at the individual level; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Dependent variables: Independent variable: 
 Psychiatric 
Caseness/morbidity  (0; 1) 
GHQ-12 
“continuous” (0-12) 
 (1) (2) 
Interest rate -0.014 
(0.012) 
-0.099 
(0.085) 
Saver -0.018 
(0.020) 
-0.150 
(0.145) 
Interest rate*Saver -0.001 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.027) 
Debt not a problem -0.034 
(0.025) 
0.087 
(0.178) 
Interest rate*Debt not a 
problem 
-0.013** 
(0.005) 
-0.091** 
(0.051) 
Somewhat of a debt burden 0.015 
(0.037) 
0.435 
(0.267) 
Interest rate*Somewhat of a 
debt burden 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.055) 
Heavy debt burden -0.044 
(0.070) 
-0.352 
(0.541) 
Interest rate*Heavy debt 
burden 
0.030* 
(0.014) 
0.261* 
(0.104) 
   
Constant 0.361 
(0.243) 
3.198† 
(1.923) 
   
Interest rate variable Year Average  Year Average  
Controls for macroeconomic 
interaction effects Yes Yes 
Observations 93255 93255 
Number of individuals 15818 15818 
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Figure captions 
Fig 1: The Bank of England base-rate (left hand vertical axis) and psychiatric caseness (top: 
right hand vertical axis, bottom: horizontal axis) among the heavily indebted in the 
corresponding base-rate period from September 1995-April 2009. We calculated the 
proportion of individuals reaching the threshold for psychiatric caseness/morbidity among 
persons that were heavily indebted across each of the 52 interest rate periods. In many cases 
there were insufficient observations to ensure reliable estimates of psychiatric 
caseness/morbidity among this group due to relatively few or no individuals being 
interviewed in that interest rate period (23 interest rate periods have 10 or less observations). 
We plotted for each interest rate period, where there were sufficient observations within each 
interest rate period (n > 40), the incidence of psychiatric caseness/morbidity against the Bank 
of England base-rate (r = .48, p < .05). 
 
 
